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"The Son of Man took to Himself no special privilege of birth or wealth or class or office; He stood upon His manhood.

"The pure in heart see men as well as God as they are, and have the sweet reasonableness to deal with them as they should.

"It is not the being loved but the loving with a divine love that is our salvation."

Though Professor Du Bose could not be called a mystic, a careful reader will find many points of resemblance between his mode of approaching theological problems and that of such men as the author of *Theologica Germanica*, Tauler, and Angelus Silesius.

EDITOR.

PSYCHOLOGY MORE THAN A SCIENCE.¹

Psychology, or the study of the soul, can have its origin only within that very consciousness which is at the same time the object of its investigation. It is for this reason that psychology has been considered a branch of philosophy and has shared the same lot, now honored and now under suspicion, banished. It is a well-known fact that psychology has been banished by rigorous positivism. Perhaps in so doing extreme positivism has been logical without being aware of it.

If by science is understood the classification of facts, and if by facts we mean those perceptible to the external senses only, psychology has no place in science or among facts. A superficial observer would be tempted to attribute the abandonment of psychology to the triumphant taste for natural science. Nothing is farther from the truth than this. It is either a slander or an over-valuation, whichever you wish to regard it.

If materialism is to be approved because it is a system, we could not legitimately derive a system from the taste for and the habit of studying natural facts that are scattered, divergent, and without unity. The process of reducing to a unity, even to what spiritualists and critics consider a false unity, belongs always to the province of metaphysics; it always exceeds the bounds of facts. If on the other hand you say that the exclusion of psychology is to be condemned, nothing is more incorrect than to attribute it to natural science which might easily be accused of confusing psychical with

¹ Address delivered at the sixth International Congress of Psychology, held at Geneva, Switzerland, in August, 1909, and translated from the French of Professor Billia by Lydia G. Robinson.

other facts under the guise of vital phenomena, but not of denying or excluding them. The trained man, whether investigator, student, naturalist or physicist, never dreams of excluding the facts of the soul, one of which is his own study, and another the pleasure which he derives from it; rather does he bring about an absorption of himself in the world which is at the same time an unconscious absorption of the world in his own personality.

Let us consider that it is to the founder of modern physics that we owe the great discovery² of the entirely psychical nature of colors, tastes, odors and sounds, which has opened the way for all the progress of the psychology, of the critique, and even of the metaphysics for which the philosophy of our day considers itself indebted to Berkeley, Hume, Descartes and Kant, and which may still advance so far as to assign resistance and extent³ to the same class, and to recognize their psychical nature. Indeed the exclusion of psychical facts betrays too arbitrary a character to endure; psychology would return to science by right of observation and classification of facts, because sensation, intellection, pleasure, grief, memory, association and consciousness, are facts no less than those which are recognized as such in the organic and physical realm.

All parties seem to gain by this transaction: positivism loses something of its particularism and becomes truly positive in not excluding any facts; spiritualism returns to science with its unique facts and in a very favorable condition to rid itself of the useless burden of metaphysical presuppositions. After all, this is a good method, to deny nothing, to assume nothing; facts, facts, nothing else but facts. Let us not trouble any more about spirit or soul, or the ego, or the beginning, or the end; all this is beyond the sphere of human knowledge and especially of science.

But I have shown elsewhere that this position can not be sustained and that the conception is inconceivable.⁴ Consciousness and the ego are not hypotheses, nor are they the verbal consequences of psychical acts, but rather the condition of those acts. Psychical acts do not exist except in consciousness and they are not conceiv-

² I have already stated elsewhere that I would not dare either to affirm or deny but that some philosopher of antiquity had an insight into this truth; perhaps Plato, especially in some part of the *Theaetetus*.

³ I tried to do this in a critical analysis of the very admirable essay on *La Matière*, ("Matter") by the late Ernest Neville. This memoir is an extract from the reports of the Academy of Moral and Political Science.

⁴ In my address before the Congress of Psychology at Rome, "*L'Oggetto Della Psicologia*," which has also been translated into French by Professor Beurrier and published in the *Revue de Philosophie*.

able nor can they be verified except in the self and as the acts of a conscious mind. It is not sensation which produces association, but sensation is an association. And it is not association which produces consciousness and the illusion called self; but it is consciousness, it is the self which makes the association. From this follows the irrefutable conclusion, that internal observation is not simply the principal means but the only instrument, the only source of psychology, and that the method of psychological laboratories, in spite of their excellent intentions and of their serious investigations, rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding and an insurmountable contradiction: namely, that the mind and mental facts must be studied in a place where they are not present, and can not be.⁵ I based my thesis upon one observation, among others, which now leads me still further, that is to say to the conclusion reached in this paper.

All the other sciences have for their object things which can be observed and which do not suffer any change by being studied. Psychology, on the contrary, changes its own object at every instant and this object is ourselves. Here is a greater difference between psychology and the other sciences, a more fundamental discrepancy, than could be found between any of the other sciences. Geology for instance makes a study of soils, but it does not produce them; psychology not only studies sentiments, affections and moral uplift, but is itself a sentiment; it is itself affection and moral uplift. A glance thrown upon the facts of the soul does not leave these facts the same as they were before: if I perceive that I am ignorant I am no longer so ignorant as I was; if I perceive that I am sinful I would usually commence to improve myself; if I perceive that I have become the toy of passion, that passion then begins to lose its domination; when a people perceives that it is not free it takes one step towards becoming so in recognizing that it is its duty to be free.

Again, the other sciences do not modify us or change us in any particular; while on the other hand we can not study sentiments without arousing them, cultivating them and changing ourselves completely. The objection may be raised that every sort of study, and every additional piece of knowledge changes us and modifies us in so far that we were ignorant before acquiring it and afterwards have become informed to that extent. Thus far one might

⁵ This is the subject of my lecture at Heidelberg, *A quoi servent les laboratoires de psychologie?* translated by Lydia G. Robinson and published in *The Monist* of July, 1909, with slight revision, under the title, "Has the Psychological Laboratory Proved Helpful?"

say that all the sciences participate in psychology, rather than to say that psychology is like the other sciences. But the effect is not really the same. If I observe, consider and comprehend a series of numbers, let us say from 7 to 27, at each number I remain almost in the same condition; the change in myself is not proportional to the number of ideas received. On the other hand, if I not only name twenty shades of sentiment, but if I should study them attentively; for instance, love, hate, desire, austerity, joy or bitterness, compassion or hardness of heart, selfishness or devotion, I would myself indeed pass through the twenty shades of sentiment and even more; I myself would become the twenty good things or evil. In the other sciences the personality is forgotten; it is necessary to forget oneself. But in psychology one enters more and more within himself, and this in an active way or in such a way that he knows no alternative, and he does not act at all without being conscious of it. All psychology lies in this, and it is inconceivable in any other way. Hence the fundamental opposition between psychology and the other sciences; hence psychology is something more than a science, it is life, and in this lies its responsibility. The other sciences teach and enlighten us, psychology is ourselves. And just as we are not simple objects of curiosity such as rocks, or the feet of insects, or Niagara Falls, but a will which must perform a duty, and as that duty is fundamentally the uplift of our feelings and of our entire nature; so psychology is not only a simple observation, nor can it be simply the observation of all feeling; but it is careful, scrupulous choice and perfection itself.

People often speak of the applications of psychology; perhaps in doing so they underrate it. Psychology contains its own applications. Every glance which the mind directs upon itself is at the same time both theory and practice. There is no such thing as pedagogy, there is only psychology. We have no certain way to control the feelings of others, even of little children. Those who feel most sure of an infallible result end by accomplishing nothing at all, or else an effect contrary to the one they wish. It is certainly a paradox that the measure of an educator is not what he succeeds in making of his pupils but in what he is himself. An educator is not bound to make others good. The theory and art of education consists in arousing in one's self, and then cultivating and perfecting the kindest and most generous feelings for children and for everyone, and directing to the service of this good feeling the classification of ideas, the sum total of one's knowledge, and the mastery

of one's self. It is said of some teacher that he has such a way of doing, of managing, of explaining, that he wins others to him, that he helps them, that he makes them understand and makes them love him. Very good, but what is all that if not his own quality? Let us consider the immense weight of an expression very common in all the countries of continental Europe. When they want to exhort a man to be on his good behavior, to give up his vices, and to conquer his passions, they say simply, "Come (or return) to yourself." In employing this strong expression they do not mean the sophistical pride of the man who wishes it understood that he himself is the moral law; but they merely mean to acknowledge that the revelation of moral law as well as every effort to execute it, to correct one's evil inclination or to advance in the path of good, lies simply in an act of reflection, of concentration and of self-examination; that it is not in books, much less in statistical tables, that our law may be found, but within ourselves.

And if this is true of every meditation and every examination of conscience, if it is true of the first steps of consciousness, what a mistake it would be not to recognize that it is still more true of the regular and constant application of the mind to the study of itself, which is called psychology? And that psychology is indeed something different and higher than any other science, for it is the habitual practice of this application together with the transformation and uplift which follows? That it is not only a fact of ethics but its true actualization?

When learning the elements of mental science it is necessary and very useful to first distinguish and clearly establish the existence, the nature, the degrees, and the kinds of sentiments and emotions, and afterwards their moral value. Before the statement is made that such or such a sentiment exists it must be defined, and not until then should it be judged as to whether it is good or bad, whether or not it responds to the ideal of morality, of justice and of perfection. Indeed there is nothing less easy than to confine oneself to this order of procedure, to guard oneself from confusing at first sight the moral consideration, the valuation from the moral point of view, with what ought to be the purely psychological description. But we can not be severe with regard to this confusion and premature synthesis. It is according to the nature of things that moral valuation is not only important from the practical point of view, but it is an integral part of existence and of the nature of psychical facts. Such a sentiment as love for one's neighbor, filial

affection and love of justice, exists and can be comprehended only in relation to, and dependent upon, its moral value. Psychology, the science of consciousness, should acquire a high consciousness of itself. This would not be only an elegant detail in the department of erudition but an actual ennoblement of the mind and of humanity. When psychology shall have advanced to the true and complete idea of itself it will raise to the loftiest heights all culture and life. Even ethics will gain thereby. Abandoned forever will be the petty etymological peripatetic conception that ethics is the science of customs. As soon as people comprehend that the mind is everything and that everything is in the mind, that the mind is not a means but an end, is not a part of a certain totality, but what has hitherto been conceived as the all is only an effect and a part of mind; we will comprehend that there is no goodness outside of the mind, and we shall easily come to recognize in ethics the science of character and of duty. Every question, every social and political problem should be solved in view of the rights and the finality of the mind. Government, property and customs will be for the mind. The mind has too long been subordinated to its own creations.

L. MICHELANGELO BILLIA.

TURIN, ITALY.

NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC.

Mr. Charles S. S. Peirce adds the following explanation to his comment on non-Aristotelian logic, published on page 45 of the present number of *The Monist*.

"It does not seem to me to have been a lunatic study. On the contrary, perhaps if I had pursued it further, it might have drawn my attention to features of logic that had been overlooked. However, I came to the conclusion that it was not worth my while to pursue that line of thought further. In order to show what sort of false hypotheses they were that I traced out to their consequences, I will mention that one of them was that instead of the form of necessary inference being, as it is, that from A being in a certain relation to B, and B in the same relation to C, it necessarily follows that A is in the same relation to C, I supposed, in one case, that the nature of Reason were such that the fundamental form of inference was, A is in a certain relation to B and B in the same relation to C, whence it necessarily follows that C is in the same relation to A; and I followed out various other similar modifications of logic."

We deny "that from A being in a certain relation to B, and B in the same relation to C, it necessarily follows that A is in the